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INFORMATION SYSTEMS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Eric K. Clemons and Steven 0. Kimbrough
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT
There is general agreement among academic researchers that information systems can
prove strategic if they are well crafted. However, the field currently lacks frameworks
that predict which applications might provide lasting benefit and sustainable competitive
advantage. Moreover, little has been attempted in analyzing effects on the organization of
industry. These effects may, in the long term, prove at least as interesting as effects on
individual firms. We present here an initial examination of the effects of information
systems and telecommunications on the competitive position of firms. Our intention is to
provide guidelines for choosing opportunities that convey sustainable competitive advan-
tage. We present also an initial analysis of predicted changes in the organization of
industry. This work draws on field research and on recent work in market economics.
INTRODUCTION assessing options and choosing preferred strate-gies, seem yet more distant.
A growing literature attests to the fact that in-
formation systems can be used as competitive There are firms that, through well-timed and
weapons within the context of a market well-crafted applications, have achieved reduced
economy (Clemons, et al., 1984; Clemons and
costs or enhanced service for their customers,
McFarlan, 1986; Harris, 1985; Ives and Lear- leading to improved margins or increased
month, 1984; Jonscher, 1983; McFarlan, 1984; market share; perhaps they have also gained
Petre, 1984; Porter, 1985; Rackoff, 1985; sustainable competitive advantage.
Merrill
Wiseman, 1985). This literature largely relies Lynch Cash Management Accounts, American
on a common and perhaps overworked collec- Hospital Supply and McKesson Drug Company
tion of examples that plausibly demonstrate use
distribution systems, and American Airlines and
of information systems to gain competitive ad- United Airlines reservation systems are among
vantage. Since the authors' tone is generally the most widely-cited examples of such applica-
evangelical, the examples selected are those that
tions. Many others are known. There have also
can be described as major successes. Unhappily, been mistakes, of which very little is written.
neither the literature not the oral tradition goes
into much depth; both are largely anecdotal. For examples of the benefits of successful stra-
Little is understood by way of general principles tegic choices and of the costs of mistakes, we
or theory about why certain moves work or are look initially to financial services and banking.
likely to work, or why others fail. Still less is Cash Management Accounts (CMAs), intro-
known about the longer-term organizational ef- duced by Merrill Lynch in the late '70's during a
fects on industry of existing or anticipated infor- period of high inflation and high interest rates,
mation systems technologies. Normative and successfully drew billions of dollars out of banks
predictive models, which would be valuable for and out of savings and loan institutions. Now,
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more than six years later, Merrill Lynch still en- STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE:joys an enormous market share advantage --
over half the CMA volume, and several times DISTINCTIONS AND
the share of its nearest competitor. Contrast DEFINITIONS
that with automated teller machines (ATMs),
offered by virtually all major banks. Most in-
dustry observers acknowledge that the universal There has been much attention paid to strategic
adoption of ATMs has benefitted the substantial information systems applications in the popular
portion of retail customers who use them. How- press. Articles are frequently found in the New
ever, since ATMs are offered by almost all York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and
banks, they have conferred neither margin nor Fortune Magazine. Business Week recently
market share advantage. Moreover, they do not ran a cover story on "Information Power"
appear to have reduced banks' expenses; custo- (Harris, 1985). The treatment in these sources
mers use them frequently, as cash machines, but certainly helps to advance general awareness of
do not appear to be substantially reducing either the possibilities inherent in information sys-
papers transactions or their need for interaction tems, and it probably enhances the belief that
with bank personnel. Finally, in the area of information systems can be essential compon-
electronic home banking, we find banks that ents of corporate strategy. And yet we find this
have invested millions of dollars in developing treatment, as well as that in the academic litera-
and advertising the service. Consumer demand ture, in many ways quite deficient. By way of
for home banking, however, appears minimal. introducing our own framework for analysis, we
No bank has successfully exploited the service begin with four basic points:
as a means of increasing share or margins, or of
1. Innovation that results in greater ef-reducing costs.
ficiency - doing something better -
may or may not yield competitiveHow can we explain the differences in these ap- advantage.plications? CMAs have been widely copied and
are generally available. yet the original deve-
loper continues not only to benefit, but to 2. What is essential for doing business
dominate. This surely looks like sustainable may or may not be strategically im-
competitive advantage. ATMs likewise are portant.
generally available, yet they appear to have con-
ferred competitive advantage on none of their 3. What is strategically important may
offering banks; rather, they appear only to have or may not yield competitive advan-
increased costs throughout the industry. And at tage.present, both of these appear successful when
compared to electronic home banking, which is
largely being ignored by consumers. 4. Competitive advantage may or may
not be lasting.
Unexplained as these differences are, we do not
believe them unexplainable. The main goal of Better Operations May Not be Strategic
this paper is to put forward several, hypotheses
on the organizational effects on industry of in- First, we distinguish between doing somethinR
formation systems technology. These better and Raining competitive advantaRe.
hypotheses, we believe, are plausible and sup- Surely, if you gain competitive advantage you
ported by what evidence is now available. likely are doing something better, but doing
Within information systems technology, our something better need not confer competitive
main emphasis will be on telecommunications advantage. If there is something to be done bet-
technology, although we recognize that no fast ter (e.g., faster, cheaper) and everyone can do it
distinction can be made between telecom- easily, then everyone will, and the competitive
munications and other applications of infor- scene will remain unaltered. To take an IS ex-
mation systems. For present purposes, what ample, consider automating payroll. It is clearly
counts as a telecommunications application is cheaper to do so than to rely on a manual sys-
one in which the movement of information over tem, but the means to do so are available to all.
a significant distance matters critically in figur- Consequently, all firms of a reasonable size have
ing the·value of the given application of IS tech- automated their payrolls and none has altered
nology. its competitive position.
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The distinction between doing things better and Clearly, information systems will continue to be
gaining competitive advantage is often lost or useful, even essential. Will they continue to be
blurred in the IS literature. Porter notes that, strategic? How, and to what extent, will
"A technology is important for competition if it communications- based applications yield op-
significantly affects a firm's competitive advan- portunities for firms to gain advantage or to
tage or industry structure" (Porter, 1985). Much radically alter the structure of an industry?2
of the literature, however, is concerned with
showing that firms have projects of strategic im-
portance to them and that these projects often
depend on IS. For example, "Information tech- Strategic Importance Need Not
nology can be used to support or shape the Confer Advantage
firm's competitive strategy by supporting or
shaping strategic thrusts. Strategic thrusts,
therefore, constitute the mechanisms for con- This takes us to our third distinction, that be-
necting business strategy and information tween what is strategically important and whatconfers competitive advantage A firm hastechnology" (Rackoff, 1985). Given the per- competitive advantage if it is able to obtain
vasiveness of information systems, it would be returns on its investments  n a given industry)very surprising if they did not often figure as that are better than normal. Clearly, anythingcomponents in so-called strategic thrusts; so do that gives good promise of yielding competitivelabor and raw materials. advantage is strategically important. But some-
thing that threatens the competitive position of
a firm (and hence alters industry structure
significantly) is also strategically important.
Even Essential Systems May Not Something may be strategically important not
Be Strategic because it confers advantage, but because failingto attend to it results in strategic disadvantage.
With regard to our second point, there is no Actions may need to be taken out of strategic
doubt that information systems are becoming necessity, a point we reexamine later.
ever more pervasive in business. The computer
and communications industry continues to draw
an increasing share of the GNP at the same time
that it consistently improves price/performance Advantage May Not Be Sustainableindices. None of this, however, necessarily im-
plies that either computing or communications
is strategically important to anyone who uses Our fourth and final distinction is betweentemporaryand lasting (or sustainabld) competi-them.1 Our second distinction, then, is between
what is strategically important and what is tive advantage. Projects that, for example,
essential for doing business Information sys- reduce costs and thereby permit realization of
tems are, without question, essential for doing better than normal returns on investments mayloosely be said to confer competitive advantage.business; so is air. But usually all industry par- But if competitors can duplicate the effectticipants have full and equal access to air. quickly, whatever advantage was achieved is
only temporary. Projects of this sort are nice to
Something is strategic if it significantly affects find, but should be analyzed much as any other
either the competitive position of a firm or the capital budgeting investment. It is misleading to
structure of its industry (see Porter, 1980, 1985; speak of them as being strategically important.
Ives and Learmonth, 1984). For an IS applica- Our practice will be to speak of an IS invest-tion to be strategically important, it is not ment as yielding competitive advantage only if
enough that it be essential to doing business; . -
firms must also differ in their ability to develop 2For present purposes we can use Porter's model of in-or to exploit this application. These differences dustry structure as consisting of five factors: suppliers.
among firms can have many origins; difference buyers, new entrants, industry competitors, and substitutes.
in technical skills, available financial resources, Industry structure changes when the power relationships
or technical infrastructures are possible. among these factors changes significantly.
3Whether normal should be defined in terms of the in-
lof course, they must be strategically important to the dustry as a whole or in terms of investments as a whole is an
sellers of these products. but that's a different matter. issue we leave open at present.
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the advantage is sufficiently long-lived to be As Porter notes:
considered as altering industry structure. The Even if the technological change isdistinction is genuine, even if imprecise. imitated, therefore, it will lead to a
competitive advantage for a firm if it
skews drivers in the firm's favor. For
example, a new assembly process that
SOURCES OF ADVANTAGE is more scale-sensitive than the pre-
vious process will benefit a large-
With these distinctions and definitions before share firm that pioneers it even if
us, it is perhaps less obvious that competitors eventually adopt the
telecommunications-based applications are technology (p. 172).
strategically important to their users. And if
this is obvious, it is certainly not obvious how While it is far from obvious what particular ef-telecommunications can confer strategic advan- fects telecommunications-based applicationstage. On technology in general, Porter (1985) will have in this regard, it is likely that scale ef-identifies four factors that may allow a tech- fects will be significant only for massively com-nological change to yield sustainable competitive plex and costly implementations.
advantage.
1. The technological change itself First-mover advantages, the third factor above,lowers cost of enhanced differentia- will figure importantly in what follows. Impor-tion and the firm's technological tant questions have to do with how extensive
lead is sustainable. these opportunities are. It may be that the well
known success stories of strategic use of
2. The technological change shifts cost telecommunications rely on such first-mover ef-
or uniqueness drivers in favor of a fects and that opportunities of this sort are rare.
firm.
Finally, there is the case of improved industry
3. Pioneering the technological change structure. In fact, in one of the examples cited
translates into first-mover ad- above, airline reservations, it can be argued that
the publicized strategic applications actuallyvantages besides those inherent in harmed industry structure by reducing profits ofthe technology itself. all participants.
4. The technological change improves
overall industry structure (pp.
171-176). INFORMATION SYSTEMS CAN
What, then, can be said about the strategic im- BE STRATEGIC
portance of telecommunications? The current
trends in technology and in pricing are produc- McKesson Drug Company is a widely publicizeding a movement away from private networks innovator in the use of interorganizational in-and towards measured service via regulated or formation systems (Corey, 1985; Kleinfield,unregulated common carriers. Communications 1984) for support of customers. McKesson'sservices will be available to all, and at competi- systems' most obvious effect is in support oftive prices. Communications alone, therefore, customers' order entry; in fact, the system helpscannot be the basis of sustainable advantage. the customers in all aspects of running their
For example, telemarketing has proven to be a pharmacies.
tremendously effective marketing tool, but
anyone can hire people to make telephone calls. To place an order the store clerk walks throughIt would surely seem then, that it will be the ap- the retail store, waving a wand bar-code readerplication systems rather than the telecom- at any item in limited supply; the product ismunications network that conveys advantage. recorded on a small cassette recorder. When a
circuit of the store is finished, the clerk can dial
Porter's second condition is perhaps more (or auto-dial) McKesson's computer, whichpromising in the case of telecommunications. reads the cassette and creates an order, reorder-
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ing each item requested in the customer's stan- generalizing hypotheses are suggested here? We
dard reorder quantity. Order entry couldn't be begin to answer the question by making a small
much easier. appeal to theory.
Items are shipped to pharmacies already It would be surprising if it were possible to have
marked with the individual pharmacy's current a solid theory of the strategic uses of telecom-
prices, which are stored on McKesson's compu- munications without linking that theory to cur-
ter. Additionally, McKesson has the floor plan rent thinking in the field of industry organiza-
of each retail operation with which it deals and tion. If telecommunications is used for competi-
items are placed in boxes in reverse order of that tive advantage, then industry structure will
in which they will be needed; that is, the items change, and one would expect that such specific
encountered on the first shelves will be on the cases would exemplify more general principles.
top of the shipment. The customer thus res- In fact, we believe that at least part of the litera-
tocks by making one circuit through the store, ture in industry organization is quite pertinent
removing prepriced items and placing them on to gaining an understanding of the strategic ef-
shelves. Like order entry, restocking could not fects of telecommunications.
be much easier.
In a series of widely cited works, Oliver Wil-
McKesson provides rapid and reliable restock- liamson has developed what he calls the trans-
ing; combined with easy and inexpensive reor- action cost approach to the study of industrial
dering, this leads the customer to reorder only organization (1979, 1981, 1985). This approach
when supply is needed rather than batching or- proceeds:
ders and maintaining safety stock. McKesson ...by making the transaction-
also provides additional services to their custo- rather than commodities-the basic
mers, including a billing service to support
house charge accounts and a database of drug unit of analysis and by assessing
interactions and counter- indications. governance structures, of which firmsand markets are the leading alter-
natives, in terms of their capacities toThis really does appear to be a pretty piece of economize on transaction costswork. Assessing benefits to McKessons custo-
mers is far easier and far more direct than as- (Williamson, 1980. p. 549).
sessing benefits to McKesson. It is problematic
to determine if McKesson enjoys margins Williamson believes that much of industrial or-
greater than average for its industry or it is has ganization, especially organizational boundaries,
substantially increased market share. The prin- can be explained by appealing to firms's at-
ciple result of this system may have been limited tempts to lower their transaction costs.
to change in industry structure, the driving out Williamson's central idea is a simple one and
of small local distributors. However, the prin- can be stated as follows. Economic exchanges
ciple factor of this system - ease of use and themselves have costs. Certain types of ex-
reduced (nonfinancial) transaction costs for cus- changes are more costly than others. In at-
tomers - warrants more formal analysis. We tempting to economize on such transaction
turn to this in the following section. costs, firms have various organizational options,
principally the option of acquiring the goods in
the marketplace or producing the goods within
the firm. That is, transaction costs affect the
Transaction Costs make-vs.-buy decision and Williamson holdsthis decision to be very significant in determin-
ing much of industrial organization.
The McKesson example plausibly shows, at the
very least, that telecommunications can be used
to affect industry structure. McKesson may or To illustrate, buying light bulbs is a transaction
may not have gained competitive advantage inherently less costly than buying, say, legal ad-
with its automated ordering system, but an over. vice. Contracting for light bulbs is straightfor-
all effect has certainly been to reduce the num. ward for both supplier and purchaser. Light
ber of players in the industry. Telecommunica- bulbs are standard, known quantities, about
tions, in this example, is strategically important, which there is little ambiguity. Moreover, the
and the application resulted in something-4n. supplier does not make any large transaction-
ventory reordering4eing done better. What specific investment. If the supplier loses a cus-
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tomer, the investment in infrastructure to action costs, as opposed to pure production costs,
produce the bulbs can be recovered by selling may be the rule rather than the exception for
the light bulbs elsewhere. strategically important telecommunications sys-
tems.
The case of legal advice is different in at least
two ways. First, it is very difficult to specify un-
ambiguously what the purchaser is buying; thus,
argues Williamson, the purchaser must expend HYPOTHESES
effort to monitor the contract for services, lest
when interests diverge the lawyers extract extra
benefits at the expense of the client. Second, it Conditions Necessary for Sustainable
is often the case that much of what an attorney Competitive Advantage
would learn in providing services is firm-
specific. The investment made to acquire such Our working hypothesis is that interorganiza-
knowledge is not transferable to other clients. tional information systems that convey sustain-
The former condition gives the supplier power able competitive advantage will possess all of the
over the purchaser, while the second condition following characteristics:
confers power to the purchaser. The net result
of this, in Williamson's view, is much haggling 1. They will reduce costs or add value
about what is to be done and consequent loss of for customers and users. The most
resources. The main recourse for a purchasing attractive way to reduce costs is tofirm in such a case is to develop the capacity in- reduce transaction costs, makinghouse to provide the needed service. And we systems easier for customers to usenote that few firms make their own light bulbs,
but many have their own legal departments. without reducing vendor prices.
2. They will entail substantial switch-Williamson offers no precise definition of trans-
action costs, as opposed to other costs. For our ing costs (also called idiosyncratic
purposes, the transaction costs of an economic investment) on the part of the custol
exchange can be characterized as the costs of nner or user.
making the exchange happen satisfactorily.
These are to be distinguished from the costs of 3. There will be a small window of op-
actually producing the goods exchanged. Thus, portunity. Alternatively, and morefor example, in purchasing a car the costs of the formally, we can state this by sayingtransaction include shopping around for the car, that the ratio of customer adoptionnegotiating a price, arranging for financing, and
waiting for delivery. If the dealer must be time to competitor copy time is quite
small.prodded to meet the full terms of the agreement
of sale, then both the cost of the prodding and
, the cost of the monitoring to determine that We address each of these in turn. We apologize
prodding is needed are part of the transaction if these appear obvious after explanation; a
cost. review of the literature and of recently at-
tempted information systems reveals that they
The transaction cost approach to the study of in. are not yet common knowledge among academic
dustrial organization is more complex and sub_ researchers, systems architects, or strategic
tle than portrayed here. Moreover, the ap- planners.
proach is controversial and is surely not the
final word on industry organization. The ap- The first point claims that systems cannot be
proach, however, is very intriguing for the pur- strategic unless they fill some need, either by
pose of suggesting hypotheses regarding the stra- reducing costs or providing improved service to
tegic importance and effects of telecommunica- users. The current failure of home banking and
tions systems and information systems videotex services demonstrates the need to fill
generally. In the case of McKesson, it is pretty some customer need and the penalty of failing to
obvious that monitoring inventory and reorder- do so. The success of American Hospital Supply
ing stock is a transaction, the cost of which was and McKesson Drug Company illustrates the
dramatically lowered by the information system benefit to be gained by reducing either hard
in question. We believe that lowering of trans- financial costs or perceived transaction costs, or
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by providing improved and differentiated ser- vantage, we require that the body of early adop-
vice. ters be large. This, in turn, requires that the
rate of adoption of the system be rapid when
Systems that fill a need and provide real benefit, compared to the rate at which competitors can
and do so at reasonable cost, will create demand. copy it. If adoption is rapid, and competitors
They will, in some cases, increase the respond only slowly, then there will be, at least
innovator's market share, and in other cases will initially, a first mover effect providing real
grow the product or service market or create a benefit to early developers. If, in addition, thegains from early adopters can be defended, therenew market for an entirely new product or ser- exists the possibility of sustained profit due to
vice. This is unlikely to yield sustainable advan- sustainable competitive advantage. Only sys-tage unless the innovator's gains can De tems offering sustainable above-market profits
protected against incursions from competitors. can be said to yield sustainable competitive ad-As such protection for distribution systems and
other services is rarely available through vantage.
patents-neither services nor processes are
eligible for patent protection--the innovator will The commonly cited examples of strategic infor-
usually retain its gains only if the customer can mation systems can all be readily seen to satisfy
be persuaded not to move to a new supplier. all three of our criteria. Merrill Lynch's Cash
Management Account provided interest rates
approximately three times that of a passbookSeveral mechanisms exist for protecting the cus- savings account and thus offered real value totomer base, ranging from constant improvement customers. Once a customer's portfolio was en-
by the original offerer to sanctions against tered as a Merrill Lynch CMA, it required sig-potential defectors.4 The most effective nificant effort by the customer to transfer to
mechanism to date has been customers' switch- another company, and no real advantage, asing costs. A customer who changes suppliers of Merrill Lynch continuously improved their
an electronic service- a travel agent, an indus- original offering. Finally, adoption was verytrial purchasing agent, a user of a cash manage- rapid as large sums flowed into Merrill Lynch
ment account-forfeits a large, and largely un- CMAs within days of introduction, while com-recoverable, idiosyncratic investment. This in- petitors required nine to eighteen months tovestment may include any or all of the follow- respond. The effects of this combination ising: procurement of special purpose hardware; readily apparent: Merrill Lynch provided adevelopment of software interfaces to connect valuable service and acquired an enormous and
the customer's computer application systems to valuable customer base rapidly before com-
those of the service provider; entering customer petitors could respond. Six years later Merrill
data such as inventory on hand and prices, or Lynch has retained much of this customer base.current portfolio; and training of order entry The CMA has turned out to be a strategic, and
clerks or other personnel. Only if there is some
significant switching cost or other means of sustainable, competitive
advantage.
holding early users can the initial developer ex-
pect to receive lasting benefit from inter-
organizational information systems.
Finally, the ability of innovators to defend their
gains counts for nought if there are no gains to Changes Expected in Industry
defend. Thus, not only do we require the ability Organization
of innovators to defend (and retain) their early
adopters if a system is to provide competitive ad- We provide the following additional hypotheses
concerning the role of communications-based
4Travel agents who use Apollo or Sabre benefit from the
information systems:
halo effect, the benefits that United and American provide
only to agents using their systems. An agency that replaces 1. Competitive advantage is more rare
its Apollo system with a competitor's offering would lose, for than strategic necessity.
example, the ability to book important business flights at the
last minute, such as Monday morning and Friday evening 2. The result of innovation may be
United flights between Chicago and New York. This is an
effective sanction discouraging defection to TWA's PARS
change in the structure of the in-
system. dustry rather than change in the
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competitive position of an in- depress or eliminate an industry's profits.5
dividual firm. Even for the in-
novator, change in industry struc-
ture may be more significant than
change in the firm's position within The role of industry standards
the industry.
The role of industry-wide standards for inter-
organizational information systems is quite com-3. The role of industry-wide standards plex. No doubt, if Johnson & Johnson hadwill be quite significant. foreseen the erosion of their hospital sales and
profits due to incursions from American Hospi-
4. Even short-term profitability for the tai Supply, made possible by the latter's
first mover may be significant as it electronic order entry system, J&J would have
may enable the innovator to drive taken defensive action. The most likely form of
defensive action would have been an industryout or acquire smaller players. standard for remote order entry, agreed upon by
J&J and major hospital chains' purchasing5. Strategic advantage due to benefits agents. Such standards might have resulted in a
resulting from reduced production cure almost as bad as the problem it was in-
or distribution costs should be ex- tended to address. Experience in other indus-
tremely rare. trial settings implies that such standard systems
result in more perfect markets and shift power
These are preliminary hypotheses based on towards large purchasers. Both phenomena
limited observation and, more heavily, on intui- shave margins and depress profits. However, it
tion. We treat each in turn, supporting with is at least plausible that the presence of industry
standards and the understanding that remote or-specific cases where possible.
der entry systems could thus provide no sustain-
able competitive advantage would serve to
restrain introduction of such systems. Relation-
ships between industry standards and industry
Competitive advantage vs. strategic organization are quite complex and remain an
necessity intriguing topic for further research.
All major banks today offer ATM services to
customers and, as these services are merged
through inter-bank consortia, they cease to Role of short-term benefits
provide differentiation. They clearly do not of-
fer competitive advantage. They are, however, a Even short-term benefits, which cannot be sus-
strategic necessity, an urban bank without an tained indefinitely, may be strategic if they
ATM network would be at a significant competi- provide other advantages. In particular, the in-
tive disadvantage. Other examples exist, and itial innovator may use early above-market
their number is increasing. profits to acquire small players that recognize
their inability to compete in the newmarketplace.
Change in industry structure
Strategic necessity, combined with large
development costs, may drive small players out
of some industries completely. Alternatively, 5they may form consortia-where regulation Airline reservation systems have without question in-
permits-in order to share development costs creased the relative strength of early developers, American
and thus survive. As communications systems and United Airlines. There is, however, widespread belief
enable large participants to respond rapidly, that by making competitive shopping so easy these systems
have depressed profits for the entire airline industry. Al-small companies that survived only as flexible though American and United are very profitable relative tolocal middlemen may no longer be cost-effective the average for their industry, it is afl open and probablyand may vanish. Electronic distribution sys- unanswerable question whether they are more profitable
tems, by providing a "perfect" market, may than they would have been in the absence of such systems.
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Competitive advantage due to prod- CONCLUSIONS
uction improvements are rare
If our earlier hypothesis concerning necessary
We suspect that difficulty in locating oppor-
tunities for strategic and competitive uses of in-
preconditions for sustainable advantage proves formation systems may in large part be because
valid, then opportunities to introduce strategic such opportunities are rare. We do not conclude
systems for production will be quite rare. This from thjs that the recent attention given to such
does not mean that systems can never be stra- systems or the priority placed on finding oppor-tegic in manufacturing organizations. More- tunities is overstressed. In most cases, the
over, even systems that do not convey competi- benefits of these systems will accrue most
tive advantage may be quite valuable, even es- heavily only to the first one or two innovators.
sential, in this environment.
We believe--and the evidence supports this
Application systems for production of opera- belief--that strategic uses of information techno-
tions are generally for internal use, and thus
will preclude the relevance of customer switch-
logy share three characteristics: such systems
provide real benefit to users; users incur sig-
ing costs and related first-mover effects. A com- nificant switching costs when changing to sys-
petitor that is late to introduce systems that tems offered by a competitor; and adoption time
reduce costs may still have to match the is short relative to the time a competitor needs to
innovator's lower prices, initially depressing copy the system, providing early developers with
profits; eventually, though, it too will have its an opportunity to develop their initial base of
system in place. The net effect, then, will pro- users. Absence of any one of these three charac-
bably be reduced producer costs and thus lower teristics probably precludes sustainable advan-
prices for customers. tage.
There will, however, still be opportunities made The additional hypotheses presented are
possible by other aspects of a firm's position. A plausible, but more preliminary. They are being
competitor with a network already in place may investigated as part of an ongoing Wharton
be able to piggyback new applications that research project in information systems,
would be prohibitively expensive without the telecommunications, and business strategy. This
network. American Airlines' reservation system project is directed by Clemons and involves a
may provide the infrastructure for its real-time cooperative effort among industrial sponsors
control of operations. This would be prohibi- and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Manage-
tively expensive for a competitor without an ex- ment Policy, Strategy, and Organization.
isting network. A firm like General Motors
could absorb development costs that would be
infeasible for smaller players like American
Motors or Chrysler.
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